Summary: Vote: YES (constitutional). This Treasury Withdrawal supports a scoped, time-bounded delivery plan for Dingo with described controls for administration and auditability consistent with the Constitution’s governance action and treasury-withdrawal standards.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal to fund delivery of Dingo, a Go implementation of a Cardano node, targeting production-grade readiness (including block-producing capability) over an approximately 12-month period, with controlled administration and accountability measures.

Constitutional consistency (v2.4)

A Treasury Withdrawal is constitutional when it is properly specified (purpose, delivery period, costs, refund/close-out mechanics), includes the required disclosures, remains within the applicable Net Change Limit, and provides credible oversight and auditability. The supporting materials associated with this action describe: (i) a defined purpose and timeframe, (ii) cost/budget framing, (iii) an administration model intended to control disbursement, (iv) public traceability/reporting and independent audit intent, and (v) segregated custody and delegation constraints for administrator-held funds.

Determination

Based on the documentation referenced by the action and the controls described, this action is assessed as constitutional and is supported with a YES vote.

Precedent Discussion: This vote supports the precedent that treasury funding for core ecosystem infrastructure (including alternative node implementations) can be constitutional when the scope is time-bounded, documentation is immutable, and spending is controlled via transparent administration, reporting, and independent audit mechanisms.

Counterargument Discussion: Key risks to monitor are (1) immutability/canonical-source ambiguity if multiple versions circulate, and (2) insufficiently specific audit/reporting commitments. These risks are mitigated when the on-chain metadata points to a single canonical immutable artifact (URL/CID + hash), and when reporting/audit deliverables are explicit and publicly verifiable.

Conclusion: YES — constitutional, provided the on-chain metadata and referenced documents remain immutable and sufficiently specific to support ongoing community auditability and oversight.

Summary: We, Cardano Curia, approve this Treasury Withdrawal (Tranche One, 50,000,000 ADA) for the Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund because the proposal is tranche-scoped, provides a defined use-of-funds and operating framework, includes transparency and reporting commitments, and sets out repayment mechanics intended to return capital (and a share of profits) back to the Cardano Treasury over time.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action is a Treasury Withdrawal requesting approval of Tranche One (50,000,000 ADA) to launch the Draper Dragon Orion Fund, a multi-year, tranche-based ecosystem investment fund. The proposal explicitly states that this vote approves only the first tranche and that any subsequent tranches require separate governance actions and community approval.

Why this is approvable under the Treasury Withdrawal requirements

The proposal provides the core Treasury Withdrawal terms needed for an informed on-chain decision:

1) Purpose and scope: The withdrawal’s purpose is clearly stated: to capitalize an ecosystem investment vehicle designed to support Cardano-native and Cardano-integrated companies and to grow on-chain usage, with an explicit intent to return value to the Treasury over time.

2) Delivery period and plan: The proposal ties Tranche One to year-one launch activities within a longer fund term, while maintaining governance control by making future capital access contingent on later votes.

3) Costs and expenses: The proposal breaks down intended allocations (direct investments, growth capital, startup acceleration/talent pipeline) and includes fund operational expenses (including audit, legal, tax, and compliance costs), with unused amounts intended to roll into investments (or otherwise remain within the described constraints).

4) Refund / non-commencement scenario: The proposal describes a refund scenario if the fund does not commence operations after the withdrawal has been enacted.

5) Prior treasury funding disclosure: The proposal states that neither the proposer (Arouet Holdings) nor the Orion Fund has received Treasury funds within the past two years.

6) Oversight, transparency, and auditability: The proposal commits to public-facing reporting (a KPI dashboard and quarterly fund reporting) and describes an LP-facing structure intended to route distributions back toward the Treasury via Arouet Holdings, including a distribution waterfall that prioritizes repayment of Treasury-attributed ecosystem support and investment capital before GP profit participation.

Why the tranche structure matters

A key governance strength of this proposal is that it does not ask voters to approve the full multi-year funding plan upfront. It requests only the minimum initial capital to begin operations and demonstrate execution and reporting. This preserves community leverage and enables future tranche decisions to be made with evidence from real deployment and reporting.

What we will monitor after approval

If enacted, we will monitor (a) publication of the fund’s public dashboard and quarterly reports, (b) evidence that treasury-attributed capital deployment and expenses match the described categories, and (c) documentation of how distributions are routed back to the Treasury in practice as exits occur.

Precedent Discussion: Approving this action supports a precedent that tranche-based Treasury Withdrawals can be used to capitalize professionally managed ecosystem investment structures when (i) the vote scope is explicitly limited to the current tranche, (ii) intended use-of-funds and expense categories are disclosed, (iii) transparency and reporting commitments are made upfront, and (iv) repayment and profit-sharing mechanics are structured to prioritize returning treasury-attributed capital before manager upside.

Counterargument Discussion: Two counterarguments are material:

1) External-manager and off-chain structure risk: A venture fund structure necessarily requires off-chain legal agreements, custody, and confidentiality around deal terms. This can reduce full public transparency on individual investments. The proposal addresses this by focusing public reporting on ecosystem-level KPIs and fund-level reporting while preserving confidentiality for sensitive deal terms.

2) Long-horizon outcomes and performance uncertainty: Venture returns are uncertain and typically realized over many years. The proposal mitigates this by (a) limiting the current vote to Tranche One only, (b) requiring future tranches to be separately approved, and (c) describing reporting intended to enable performance-based evaluation before additional capital is requested.

Conclusion: For the reasons above, we, Cardano Curia, approve this Treasury Withdrawal as a well-scoped first tranche request with disclosed allocation categories, defined governance control via tranche-based approvals, and an intended treasury-aligned return structure supported by transparency and reporting commitments. Future tranches should be evaluated independently based on published reporting, observable ecosystem impact, and demonstrated operational discipline.

Summary: Cardano Curia (CC) supports the community approval request to appoint the Cardano Foundation (CF) as the new managing entity (Administrator) for Project Catalyst, enabling a full and effective transition of Catalyst operations from IOG to CF and preserving continuity for Funds 10–14.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action is an Info Action requesting community approval to appoint the Cardano Foundation (CF) as the new managing entity (the “Administrator”) for Project Catalyst, transitioning operational stewardship from Input Output Group (IOG) to CF in accordance with the statutes of the Catalyst Foundation Company (CFC).

Cardano Curia (CC) position

Cardano Curia (CC) records a YES position as a vote of support for CF becoming the new managing entity for Catalyst.

Positive rationale for support

- Continuity of operations for existing grantees (Funds 10–14): The proposal’s stated purpose is to prevent an operational pause that could delay milestone reviews and eligible payouts. CC prioritizes continuity for teams currently delivering and timely resolution of legacy obligations.

- Clear accountability and operational stewardship: Appointing a single, named managing entity makes responsibility for Catalyst operations legible and reduces ambiguity for grantees and participants.

- Statutory compliance and an orderly transition: CFC’s statutes require a Cardano community decision to transfer the Administrator role. This Info Action provides an explicit, auditable on-chain signal to enable a clean handover.

- Risk reduction through avoiding interruptions: The motivation and rationale emphasize that without approval by the end of May, Catalyst operations could face an undetermined pause. Supporting the transition reduces the likelihood of process backlogs and operational uncertainty.

- Scope clarity relative to other roles: The proposal explicitly states it is unrelated to Intersect’s role as the constitutionally mandated budget administrator (Funds 14–16) and unrelated to the already announced return of previously approved allocations for Funds 15–16. This bounded scope enables a focused decision on Catalyst administration continuity.

What this vote is (and is not)

- Is: A governance signal supporting CF’s appointment as Administrator to enable full transition of Catalyst operations and responsibilities from IOG to CF.
- Is not: A protocol parameter change or a treasury withdrawal, and it does not alter Intersect’s budget administrator role.

Precedent Discussion: This establishes (or reinforces) the precedent that when an ecosystem program relies on an external legal/operational administrator (here, CFC’s “Administrator”), it is appropriate to use an on-chain Info Action to provide a clear, auditable community signal to enable continuity of operations—particularly where legacy obligations to builders/grantees depend on uninterrupted administration.

Counterargument Discussion: Material concerns can include (i) whether any single managing entity could centralize operational discretion, (ii) whether transition details and service levels are sufficiently documented, and (iii) whether stakeholders clearly understand boundaries between Catalyst administration and other constitutionally mandated roles. CC’s support is based on the action’s stated limited scope (administration continuity) and the expectation that CF will publish a transparent transition plan and reporting practices for Catalyst operations.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia (CC) supports this Info Action and encourages a timely approval outcome so Catalyst operations and responsibilities can transition from IOG to CF without interruption, minimizing delays to milestone reviews and eligible payouts for Funds 10–14 while preserving clarity on non-scope items (Intersect’s budget administrator role and the separate Fund 15–16 allocation return).

Summary: Cardano Curia recommends YES (Constitutional) on this Budget Process Framework Info Action because it records a budgeting procedure without altering protocol parameters, treasury authority, or governance powers, and it may improve transparency and accountability in treasury spending.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This is a Governance Information Action that records the Intersect Budget Process Framework for the 2026 budgeting year and future cycles (until modified). It describes a five-stage budgeting workflow covering: prerequisites (vision/strategy + metadata + NCL), proposal intake with templates and structured requirements, review/refinement and prioritization, consolidation into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions (TWGAs), and execution/monitoring where an Administrator may be selected.

Notable policy choices in the described workflow include a 100,000 ADA minimum request threshold for proposals in the process and a 1,000 ADA treasury donation requirement to enter the Intersect-facilitated intake flow.

Rationale thinking (constitutional assessment)

This proposal constitutes a valid Budget Info Action under the Cardano Constitution v2.4 because it records a procedural framework for ecosystem budgeting without altering protocol rules, treasury authority, or governance powers. The action does not trigger treasury withdrawal guardrails or parameter changes and therefore presents no constitutional conflict.

Evaluated against Tenets 1–10, the framework does not affect transaction performance, costs, interoperability, developer freedom, financial stability, or ADA supply, and it may improve transparency and accountability in treasury spending.

While the proposal introduces policy choices such as a 100,000 ADA minimum proposal threshold and a 1,000 ADA treasury donation requirement, these represent governance design decisions rather than constitutional violations.

Recommendation

YES — Constitutional.

Precedent Discussion: This supports the precedent that Info Actions can be used to publish and maintain shared procedural frameworks that improve predictability, transparency, and accountability in Treasury-related coordination, without changing protocol rules or directly executing Treasury spending.

Counterargument Discussion: Key concerns are:

1) Barrier-to-entry perception: the 1,000 ADA donation and 100,000 ADA minimum request could be viewed as exclusionary. As an Info Action, these are best interpreted as process design choices for the described budgeting workflow rather than changes to on-chain governance rights.

2) Process vs. authority confusion: readers may incorrectly infer the framework is binding or exclusive. Clear framing that this is a recorded procedure (not a protocol rule change and not itself a Treasury Withdrawal) mitigates misunderstanding.

3) Centralization optics: describing Intersect administration and tooling may raise centralization concerns. The framework remains informational; any actual Treasury withdrawals still require separate on-chain actions and approvals.

Conclusion: Conclusion: YES — Constitutional. This Info Action records a budgeting procedure and does not alter protocol parameters, treasury authority, or governance powers. It presents no constitutional conflict and may improve transparency and accountability for future Treasury-funded activity execution.

Summary: Cardano Curia supports this 800,000 ADA Treasury Withdrawal as a narrowly scoped, infrastructure-first step that enables accountable execution of the previously community-endorsed Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity initiative.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal of 800,000 ADA to fund the legal and technical infrastructure required to implement the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity program.

The withdrawal funds:
- Formation of a Cayman Islands Foundation Company to serve as the legal vehicle for contracting and asset management;
- An independent security audit of the treasury administration smart contract system;
- Deployment of Amaru multisig contract infrastructure to custody the withdrawn funds and manage disbursements via a 5-of-9 committee threshold.

Importantly, this withdrawal does not fund liquidity deployment itself; it establishes prerequisites so that any subsequent deployment (e.g., a later Withdrawal 2) can occur responsibly and auditable.

Summary of assessment (program context)

This Treasury Withdrawal constitutes the first operational step of a two-stage initiative previously outlined in an approved ecosystem budget proposal intended to deepen stablecoin liquidity within the Cardano DeFi ecosystem. The broader initiative sought authorization to deploy 50,000,000 ADA to improve liquidity conditions for stablecoins and ADA trading pairs while also generating revenue flows back to the treasury.

Withdrawal 1 does not fund the liquidity deployment itself. Instead, it establishes the legal, technical, and administrative infrastructure necessary to execute the initiative responsibly and transparently. Specifically, this withdrawal funds the creation of a legal entity capable of entering contracts and managing assets, the security audit of the treasury administration smart contracts, and the deployment of the Amaru contract infrastructure used to custody and manage funds during the implementation phase.

Because this governance action is part of the implementation sequence described in the original approved proposal, it should be evaluated within that context rather than as an independent treasury program. The original budget framework explicitly anticipated a two-withdrawal structure, where the first withdrawal establishes operational infrastructure and the second withdrawal funds the liquidity deployment itself.

Why Cardano Curia supports (YES)

Cardano Curia supports this withdrawal because it is:
- Bounded and specific: defined categories, capped allocations, and a 6-month completion window;
- Accountable: administrators are a named 9-person committee operating under 5-of-9 multisig approvals;
- Auditable: custody and payments occur through an on-chain contract with public traceability, plus an external smart contract audit;
- Refund-aware: explicit refund triggers for non-performance, impossibility, cost savings, governance discontinuation, and close-out remainder.

Key risks (and why they are acceptable here)

- USD-denominated legal costs / FX volatility: mitigated by paying invoices based on USD value at time of payment, with remainder ADA intended to be returned.
- Dependency on a subsequent withdrawal for liquidity deployment: acceptable because Withdrawal 1 is an enabling step; the community can evaluate delivered infrastructure before approving further funding.

Expected follow-through (non-blocking)

We expect the final submission to include immutable documentation references (URL + hash) for the canonical specification, publication of the administered smart contract code and audit report(s), and regular transparency reporting on disbursements and milestone status.

Precedent Discussion: This supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawals can be justified when they fund essential enabling infrastructure—legal capacity, custody controls, and independent security review—prior to any larger program deployment. Establishing these prerequisites first improves auditability, reduces administrator risk, and gives the community a clear checkpoint before committing additional treasury resources.

Counterargument Discussion: Two counterarguments are material:

1) Cost sensitivity / vendor concentration: legal formation via a premium provider may appear expensive relative to alternatives. This is partially mitigated by explicit category caps and the stated rationale for selecting regulatory capacity and long-term viability.

2) Program-step dependency: because this withdrawal does not deliver liquidity improvements directly, some may view it as speculative overhead. This is addressed by treating it as Withdrawal 1 of an anticipated two-stage plan, with community discretion to deny or modify any subsequent withdrawal if deliverables here are not met.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia supports this Treasury Withdrawal (YES) because it is a narrowly scoped, time-bounded, and auditable setup step for a broader liquidity initiative, with clear custody controls, independent audit funding, and explicit refund mechanisms that protect the Treasury if delivery fails or costs come in below cap.

Summary: Cardano Curia voted YES on this Info governance action as a signaling vote and show of governance participation. We consider an NCL of 350M ADA a valid target for the referenced period; this vote is not intended to enact an NCL.

Rationale: This governance action is an Info action and is used here as a signaling mechanism.

Our position:
- We consider a Net Change Limit (NCL) of 350,000,000 ADA (350,000,000,000,000 lovelace) to be a valid target for the intended period.
- We understand that CC votes are not needed for the purpose of this signaling vote on an Info action, and we are voting primarily as a show of governance activity/participation and to record a clear preference signal.

Clarity note:
- The proposal text referenced alongside this action mentions 300M ADA, while our preference signal is 350M ADA. To avoid ambiguity, the canonical text for any implementing governance action should match the intended NCL value, or a separate follow-up action should explicitly propose 350M ADA for the same period.

Precedent Discussion: None.

Counterargument Discussion: A potential concern is that signaling preferences via an Info action may be misread as enacting policy. We therefore explicitly state this is a preference signal and that any binding implementation should be done via the appropriate governance mechanism with unambiguous text.

Conclusion: We vote YES as a signaling vote: 350M ADA is a valid NCL target in our view, and this vote is intended to demonstrate participation and record our preference, not to enact an NCL.

Summary: The Constitutional Committee finds the Amaru 2026 Treasury Withdrawal constitutional, subject to final submission meeting immutability and auditability requirements.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal to fund Amaru’s 2026 work program (January–December 2026), including development toward a relay-capable node (Q1), block-producing capability (by end of Q2), protocol R&D prototypes, and ecosystem integrations, administered through a smart-contract-controlled treasury with PRAGMA maintainer committee oversight.

Constitutional and guardrails consistency (v2.4)

A Treasury Withdrawal is constitutional when it is properly specified, auditable, and consistent with guardrails on format, denomination, and oversight. The proposal describes:
- a defined purpose and delivery period (2026);
- scoped costs (FTE-based + fixed costs) and a volatility buffer policy with unused funds intended to be returned;
- governance/administration via segregated script accounts and multi-scope approvals;
- auditability measures (public journal, independent audit provisions).

Determination (with conditions)

YES on constitutionality, contingent on final submission including immutable URLs and hashes for the canonical 2026 proposal plus annexes (2025 retrospective, prior withdrawal evidence, and TxPipe audit), with translations clearly marked as translations, and with retroactive work mapped to dated deliverables and invoices for auditability.

Precedent Discussion: This supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawals funding core ecosystem infrastructure can be constitutional when the scope, budget, administration, and refund/close-out mechanics are clearly specified, and when the canonical off-chain documentation is immutable (URL + hash) and enables durable third-party auditability.

Counterargument Discussion: Two counterarguments are material:

1) Immutability and canonical-source ambiguity: If the proposal text/annexes are hosted on mutable pages or multiple versions circulate (especially with translations), future reviewers may be unable to verify what was actually approved. This is addressed by requiring immutable URLs and hashes for the canonical document and explicitly labeling translations.

2) Retroactive spending auditability: Using part of the budget retroactively (e.g., Jan–Feb 2026) can reduce clarity if not mapped to dated deliverables and invoices. This is addressed by requiring a dated deliverables→invoice→on-chain disbursement mapping in the public journal (or equivalent immutable appendix).

Conclusion: For the reasons above, the Constitutional Committee finds the action constitutional under Constitution v2.4 provided the final submission includes immutable URLs + hashes for the canonical proposal and annexes, translations are clearly marked as translations referencing the canonical hash, and any retroactive work is mapped to dated deliverables and invoices for auditability.

Summary: Cardano Curia votes YES and considers this Info Action constitutional under Constitution v2.4.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action is an Info Action proposing that the next Cardano hard fork to Protocol Version 11 be named the “van Rossem Hard Fork” in memory of Cardano community contributor Max van Rossem.

Scope and on-chain impact

This proposal concerns naming/commemoration and does not propose changes to protocol parameters, ledger rules, treasury withdrawals, or operational governance structures. As an Info Action, it is primarily an on-chain signal/record of community intent and carries no direct technical risk.

Constitutional alignment (v2.4)

The Constitution’s governance framework supports actions that improve community coordination and transparency when they do not conflict with the Constitution’s principles and do not introduce technical or fiscal risk without the appropriate action type and safeguards. This proposal is consistent with those expectations because:
- it is non-coercive and informational in nature;
- it does not purport to change requirements that would require a different governance action type;
- it is framed as a continuation of an established naming tradition for hard forks, including prior commemorative names.

Rationale and supporting context

The rationale states that Max van Rossem was a highly regarded contributor to the Cardano community and governance processes, including meaningful contributions to governance discussions, constitutional work, and CC election efforts. Naming the hard fork in his memory is presented as a way to preserve and recognize community contributions in a durable, on-chain referenced manner.

Determination

No conflict with Constitution v2.4 is identified on the face of the proposal. Accordingly, Cardano Curia finds this Info Action constitutional and supports a YES vote.

Precedent Discussion: This supports the precedent that Info Actions may be used for non-technical, non-fiscal coordination and commemorative community decisions when they remain clearly informational, do not imply protocol changes, and are supported by minimally sufficient, verifiable context and references.

Counterargument Discussion: Potential counterarguments include:

1) Subjectivity / social contention: Commemorative naming decisions can be sensitive and may not reflect unanimous community sentiment. This is mitigated by the fact that the action is informational and is decided through governance voting; dissent remains expressible through votes and public rationale.

2) Verifiability and sourcing: The proposal cites meeting minutes as supporting references. Best practice is to ensure that the key supporting documents (e.g., minutes) are available in an immutable and verifiable form (e.g., content-addressed/IPFS) so that the historical basis for the commemoration remains auditable over time.

3) Scope clarity: It should remain explicit that this naming decision does not itself enact a hard fork, alter the hard fork schedule, or change protocol parameters; it only proposes the name to be used for the Protocol Version 11 hard fork.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia determines this Info Action is constitutional under Constitution v2.4 and therefore supports a YES vote. This is in memory of Max which we all dearly miss.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds this parameter update constitutional under Constitution v2.4.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Protocol Parameter Change (part 1 of a linked two-step plan) to increase Plutus script memory execution limits, and explicitly states that no other protocol parameters or cost model settings will be changed.

The proposed updates are:
- `maxTxExecutionUnits[memory]`: 14,000,000 → 16,500,000 (+2,500,000)
- `maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory]`: 62,000,000 → 72,000,000 (+10,000,000)

Constitutional and guardrails consistency (v2.4)

Execution-budget guardrails

The proposed values and deltas are consistent with the applicable Guardrails:
- `maxTxExecutionUnits[memory]` remains below the hard cap (MTEU-M-01), is non-negative (MTEU-M-02), is not decreased (MTEU-M-03), and the increase equals the maximum recommended per-epoch increment (MTEU-M-04).
- `maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory]` remains below the hard cap (MBEU-M-01), is non-negative (MBEU-M-02), and the change equals the maximum recommended per-epoch increment (MBEU-M-03).
- The rationale states that benchmarking/simulation has been performed for the per-block change and that Praos timing guarantees remain intact, directly targeting the mandatory performance requirement in MBEU-M-04a.
- The relationship `maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] ≥ maxTxExecutionUnits[memory]` is preserved (MEU-M-01).

Voting and process guardrails for critical parameters

The rationale explicitly acknowledges that `maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory]` is a critical protocol parameter and therefore requires the additional SPO voting threshold alongside DRep approval (PARAM-03a).

It also addresses the notice expectation for critical parameter updates (PARAM-04a), stating that the intent to propose the on-chain change was published off-chain on 2025-07-07 and is not being justified as a Severity 1/2 emergency relaxation.

Network-change cadence and correlation

The two parameters changed here are directly correlated and are proposed together in alignment with NETWORK-02. The rationale also asserts that recent linked updates did not violate the cadence restriction for these parameters (NETWORK-01).

Technical scrutiny and evidence (as described in the rationale)

The rationale reports:
- Intersect Parameter Committee recommendation (2025-05-08) and Intersect Technical Steering Committee ratification (2025-10-01).
- Equivalent testnet enactments: Preview (October 2025) and PreProd (November 2025).
- Performance evaluation by IOE’s Performance & Tracing team (node versions 10.2 and 10.3), concluding adequate timing headroom and no breach of Praos timing guarantees.

These points are the appropriate types of evidence for the Constitution’s expectation that parameter updates receive sufficient technical review and do not endanger security, functionality, performance, or long-term sustainability.

Tenets alignment

The stated motivation—reducing developer friction, reducing inefficient transaction-splitting, and enabling more useful work per block while staying within measured safety margins—aligns with the Constitution’s Tenets, particularly:
- enabling developers to deploy applications without unreasonable barriers; and
- avoiding unreasonable waste of resources while evolving the system safely.

Determination

Based on the stated deltas, guardrails mapping, and the described benchmarking and review process, Cardano Curia identifies no clear conflict with Constitution v2.4 and therefore finds the action constitutional.

Precedent Discussion: This supports the precedent that measured, benchmark-driven increases to Plutus execution budgets are constitutionally permissible when they: (i) stay within hard caps and recommended per-epoch change limits, (ii) treat correlated parameters together, (iii) satisfy critical-parameter voting requirements, and (iv) include technical evidence addressing diffusion/propagation constraints for per-block execution budget changes.

Counterargument Discussion: Two counterarguments are material:

1) Decentralization / operator burden: Increasing per-block execution budgets can, over time, raise baseline resource requirements for block-producing nodes. Constitution v2.4 anticipates this risk via caps, change-rate limits, and the mandatory requirement for benchmarking and diffusion/propagation safety analysis (MBEU-M-04a). The rationale’s claimed benchmarking and timing headroom directly addresses this concern, but voters should still expect the referenced benchmark artifacts to be reviewable.

2) Long-term verifiability of evidence: Constitution v2.4 expects the off-chain document that provides necessary evaluation context to be immutable and verifiable after submission. If critical supporting evidence (benchmarks, minutes/recordings, survey outputs, PCP references) is primarily hosted on mutable web pages, future reviewers may not be able to re-validate key claims. Best practice is to pin or snapshot the critical evidence (or embed it within the immutable artifact) so that the performance and process claims remain independently verifiable over time.

Conclusion: For the reasons stated above, Cardano Curia finds this governance action constitutional under Constitution v2.4, provided that the submitted governance action includes the required immutable off-chain documentation (URL + hash) and that the key supporting evidence—especially benchmarking relevant to the per-block change—is preserved in a verifiable, preferably immutable form.

Summary: Cardano Curia judges this governance action constitutional and supports adoption of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4.

Rationale: This governance action proposes an update to the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution, introducing version 2.4. The action is correctly framed as a constitutional update and is presented with clear, structured supporting material, including immutable IPFS references and documented change logs. This satisfies the documentation and transparency expectations for constitutional amendments under the Constitution’s amendment framework.

Substantively, Constitution v2.4 improves enforceability and reduces ambiguity by distinguishing binding constitutional requirements from aspirational guidance. The removal of non-binding “expectation” and “encouragement” clauses streamlines the Constitution to focus on enforceable governance rules, while leaving community norms and operational best practices to evolve through off-chain processes.

The removal of the Budget Info Action mechanism is a coherence improvement rather than a weakening of safeguards. Treasury-related accountability requirements are consolidated into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, ensuring that auditability, oversight, and accountability apply at the point of actual fund movement. This reduces procedural duplication while preserving—indeed strengthening—clarity around when safeguards must be met.

The introduction and unification of defined terms (including concepts such as Active Voting Stake, Net Change Limit, and Treasury Withdrawal Recipient) improves interpretability and reduces the risk of inconsistent application across governance participants. Clear terminology is essential for predictable constitutional review and for minimizing disputes arising from divergent readings of key terms.

We particularly support the explicit requirement that proposal documents referenced by URL must be immutable. This materially strengthens procedural integrity by ensuring that governance actions are evaluated against fixed, verifiable texts, protecting voters and reviewers from post-submission changes and improving trust in the governance process.

Finally, the reversion of specific wording changes introduced in v2.3 in response to EMURGO’s concerns reflects prudent, consensus-driven constitutional evolution. Restoring the original wording for custodian- and audit-related provisions preserves continuity with established interpretation while still allowing the broader v2.4 improvements to move forward.

Taken together, these amendments are procedurally sound, consistent with the Constitution’s intent as a binding governance framework, and constructive for the long-term stability and legitimacy of Cardano’s on-chain governance.

Precedent Discussion: This assessment supports a precedent that constitutional amendments may (1) remove non-binding language to keep the Constitution enforceable, (2) consolidate redundant governance mechanisms while preserving safeguards at the point of execution, and (3) improve interpretability through definitions and immutability requirements. It also reinforces the value of community consensus and continuity when evolving high-salience provisions such as treasury oversight and audit expectations.

Counterargument Discussion: Some may argue that removing aspirational clauses reduces guidance for governance actors, or that consolidating mechanisms could reduce perceived checks. However, non-binding text is not enforceable by design and can blur the boundary between constitutional requirements and community norms. Likewise, consolidating treasury safeguards into Treasury Withdrawal actions preserves accountability where it matters most—when funds move—while reducing process complexity.

Others may caution that embedding definitions can create future rigidity or require frequent amendments as governance practice evolves. Cardano’s transparent, on-chain amendment pathway reduces this risk by allowing definitions to be refined openly when needed, and the added clarity today reduces the likelihood of inconsistent interpretation in the interim.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia judges this governance action constitutional and supports adoption of Constitution v2.4. The proposal is well-documented, procedurally appropriate, and improves clarity, enforceability, and accountability while preserving the balance of powers and essential treasury safeguards.