Cvria Cardani

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the proposed "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action constitutional.

Rationale: "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." (gov_action105mjyzm3spjppny2m776lwk5jnsuu07uva9tz0yg5u4nkf770rvsql5raht) is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action requesting 103,000 ada. The stated purpose is to reimburse the 100,000 ada governance-action deposit associated with the September 2024 "Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -" Info Governance Action, together with an additional 3,000 ada described as compensation for staking rewards forgone since the deposit was not returned.

Cardano Curia finds that the action satisfies the applicable requirements of Article II, Section 6 and Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution.

Article II.6 requires governance actions to follow a standardized and legible format, to reference an immutable document through a URL and hash, and to provide sufficient rationale including a title, abstract, justification, and relevant supporting materials. The proposal is anchored to a content-addressed IPFS document at https://most-brass-sun.quicknode-ipfs.com/ipfs/QmSy2CiQhPBzzNLKDFVvMQaDb1FQDbmn9bJf6fVntVAQ1t with the blake2b-256 hash abaf67cde8defc914712009094cd3805bcf8911d3fa79c6edfd6c975dcf9d471. The anchored document provides the required description and justification for the withdrawal.

Article II.7.1 requires a Treasury Withdrawal to specify its terms, including the purpose, delivery period, relevant costs and expenses, and circumstances under which funds might be refunded to the Cardano Treasury. Those terms are sufficiently specified here. The purpose is a one-time reimbursement; delivery occurs immediately as part of enactment; the requested withdrawal itself constitutes the relevant amount; no additional operating costs or expenses are identified; and the proposal states that there are no circumstances under which the payment would be refunded to the Treasury. Because the action funds no continuing programme of activities, there is no additional delivery period, milestone schedule, or programme expenditure to specify.

Article II.7.2 requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the preceding 24 months. The proposal expressly states that the recipient has not previously received Treasury funds.

Article II.7.3 requires a Net Change Limit to be set and prohibits Treasury Withdrawals from exceeding the applicable limit. The requested 103,000 ada is within the applicable Net Change Limit. The request is denominated in ada, consistent with the Treasury guardrails.

Articles II.7.4, II.7.5, and II.7.6 must be applied to the actual structure of this withdrawal. This action does not fund an ongoing programme, create a discretionary spending mandate, or establish a sequence of later disbursements. It directs a single, unconditional payment from the Cardano Treasury to the designated recipient, completed by the protocol upon enactment. The amount, destination, and completion of the transfer are permanently and independently verifiable on-chain.

Article II.7.4 requires an allocation of ada to cover periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of Treasury funds. In this specific circumstance, there is no continuing Treasury-funded activity, periodic expenditure, or discretionary use of Treasury funds to audit after enactment. The complete use of the Treasury funds contemplated by the governance action is the transfer itself. Its execution and destination can be independently verified by any observer from the immutable ledger record. Cardano Curia therefore finds that no separate audit allocation is required to achieve the constitutional audit and oversight function for this singular automated reimbursement.

Article II.7.5 requires one or more administrators responsible for monitoring how funds are used and ensuring that deliverables are achieved. The proposal names the DReps as Administrator. Cardano Curia does not rely on that designation. DReps determine whether to approve the governance action but do not exercise continuing custody or discretion over the funds after enactment. Here the sole deliverable is the payment specified by the action. The Cardano protocol executes that payment and the ledger provides the definitive evidence that the deliverable occurred. On these narrowly defined facts, the protocol performs the administrative and deliverable-assurance function contemplated by Article II.7.5.

Article II.7.6 applies while Treasury funds are being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to a Treasury Withdrawal Recipient. No intermediate custody exists in this action. The funds move directly from the Cardano Treasury to the identified recipient upon enactment. Accordingly, the separate-account and delegation requirements in Article II.7.6 are not triggered.

Cardano Curia emphasizes that this treatment of Article II.7.4 through Article II.7.6 is narrow and specific to a direct, immediate, unconditional Treasury-to-recipient payment whose entire execution is objectively verifiable on-chain. It does not reduce the audit, administration, custody, reporting, or oversight requirements applicable to ordinary Treasury Withdrawals funding programmes of work, milestones, future expenditures, or administrator-controlled disbursements.

Precedent Discussion: This decision recognizes a narrow distinction between Treasury Withdrawals that finance an ongoing programme of work and Treasury Withdrawals whose sole deliverable is one direct payment executed at enactment. In an ordinary programme, Article II.7.4 and Article II.7.5 provide essential safeguards because Treasury funds remain subject to later expenditure, administration, monitoring, and delivery risk. Those safeguards must not be displaced merely because the initial Treasury transaction is visible on-chain.

Where, however, the governance action itself completely determines the amount and recipient, the transfer is executed automatically by the protocol, no intermediary holds the funds, and there is no later Treasury-funded activity to administer, the immutable ledger record can itself provide the relevant verification of delivery. Article II.7.6 remains applicable according to its express trigger: funds being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement. A direct Treasury-to-recipient payment does not create that custody arrangement.

This interpretation is limited to materially equivalent direct-payment circumstances and must not be used to avoid the accountability requirements applicable to Treasury-funded programmes involving ongoing work, discretionary expenditure, milestones, administrators, or later distributions.

Counterargument Discussion: One counterargument is that Article II.7.4 expressly states that Treasury Withdrawals shall include an allocation of ada for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics, and therefore a separate allocation should be required regardless of the structure of the withdrawal. Cardano Curia considers the requirement in the context of the Treasury use actually authorized by this action. The withdrawal is exhausted by one automated payment at enactment. There are no periodic expenditures, no programme accounts, and no subsequent Treasury-funded activity to inspect. The ledger itself permanently records the amount and destination. In this narrowly defined circumstance, requiring a separate periodic audit budget would add an additional expenditure without creating additional meaningful oversight of the use authorized by the governance action.

A second counterargument is that Article II.7.5 expressly requires an administrator and that the protocol cannot perform that role. Cardano Curia does not treat the DReps as custodial administrators merely because the proposal names them. The constitutional function identified by Article II.7.5 is monitoring the use of Treasury funds and ensuring the deliverable is achieved. Here there is no post-enactment discretionary use to monitor and the only deliverable is the transfer itself. The protocol executes the transfer and the ledger evidences its completion. Cardano Curia therefore finds the required function fulfilled on these facts.

A further issue is the proposal's characterization of the original deposit loss as resulting from a "bug in the code of the Cardano node". The constitutional determination does not depend on adopting that technical characterization. The relevant constitutional question is whether the present Treasury Withdrawal complies with the requirements governing its submission and execution. The justification offered for the withdrawal is that an early governance participant should be reimbursed for the 100,000 ada deposit that was not returned. Whether that reimbursement, including the additional 3,000 ada, is an appropriate policy choice or use of Treasury funds is for the Cardano Community and DReps to determine within the constitutional framework; it is not, by itself, a basis for the Constitutional Committee to find the action unconstitutional.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the proposed "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit." Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action constitutional under Article II.6 and Article II.7.1 through Article II.7.6. The action is a single, immediate, unconditional, and objectively verifiable reimbursement. Its direct execution by the Cardano protocol leaves no continuing Treasury-funded programme, no discretionary administration, and no intermediate administrator custody. The interpretation applied to Article II.7.4 through Article II.7.6 is limited to these specific circumstances and does not diminish the accountability requirements applicable to ordinary Treasury-funded programmes.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the governance action "Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada and increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2)" constitutional. The proposed parameter values remain within the applicable constitutional guardrails, the Plutus memory increases follow the previously reviewed staged approach, and the supporting material provides sufficient economic and technical justification for the changes.

Rationale: ## Governance action

This governance action is a Protocol Parameter Change proposing three effective parameter changes: reduction of minPoolCost from 170 ada to 75 ada, increase of maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] from 16,500,000 to 17,500,000 units, and increase of maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] from 72,000,000 to 77,500,000 units. The Plutus memory changes constitute Part 2 of the previously reviewed staged increase and complete the intended cumulative 25 percent increase from the original values.

Governance action standards

Cardano Curia finds that the action is properly framed as a Parameter Update and provides a sufficiently clear description of the parameters being changed, their existing and proposed values, the reasons for the changes, and the supporting technical and economic evaluation. The proposal is anchored using content-addressed governance metadata, supporting the immutability and auditability requirements applicable to governance actions.

Article II, Section 6 requires Parameter Update actions to undergo sufficient technical review and scrutiny so that they do not endanger the security, functionality, performance, or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain. The supporting record demonstrates prior technical review, testing and performance analysis for the proposed Plutus memory limits, together with an economic rationale for the minPoolCost adjustment.

minPoolCost

The proposal reduces minPoolCost from 170 ada to 75 ada. This remains within the applicable mandatory guardrails. MPC-01 requires minPoolCost not to be negative, and MPC-02 establishes a maximum of 500 ada. The proposed 75 ada value satisfies both requirements.

MPC-03 further provides that minPoolCost should be set in line with the economic cost of operating a stake pool. The proposal explains that the economic environment has changed materially since the earlier calibration of the parameter, including declining block rewards and changing operating economics. The proposed adjustment is therefore supported by an identifiable economic rationale rather than being an arbitrary parameter change.

Because minPoolCost is identified as a parameter critical to the governance system, the applicable DRep voting requirement under PARAM-05a is engaged. The proposal was also publicly developed sufficiently in advance of the on-chain action to satisfy the constitutional expectation for prior publication and review under PARAM-06a.

Cardano Curia further notes that lowering minPoolCost does not compel any stake pool operator to adopt a particular operating margin or fee strategy. It adjusts the protocol-level minimum and provides operators with greater flexibility while remaining inside the constitutional boundaries established for the parameter.

Plutus memory limits

The action increases maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] from 16,500,000 to 17,500,000 units. This remains substantially below the 40,000,000-unit maximum established by MTEU-M-01. The increase is 1,000,000 units, which is also below the 2,500,000-unit per-epoch change guidance in MTEU-M-04.

The action increases maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] from 72,000,000 to 77,500,000 units. This remains substantially below the 120,000,000-unit maximum established by MBEU-M-01. The 5,500,000-unit increase also remains below the 10,000,000-unit per-epoch change guidance in MBEU-M-03.

The proposed block memory limit remains significantly greater than the transaction memory limit, consistent with MEU-M-01. Neither parameter is decreased, and the proposed values remain positive and well within their mandatory ceilings.

The proposal supplies evidence of technical evaluation of the complete intended increase, including testing of the target memory values and performance analysis indicating adequate headroom in relevant timing metrics. This supports compliance with the performance-oriented requirements of MBEU-M-04a and Article II, Section 6 regarding security, functionality and network performance.

Increasing the Plutus memory limits provides additional execution capacity for applications while preserving the constitutional requirement that parameter changes remain within safe operational boundaries. The staged approach is also consistent with the guardrails' preference for measured rather than abrupt parameter adjustments.

Voting requirements

The action engages both governance-critical and security-relevant parameter categories. minPoolCost engages the applicable DRep requirement, while maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] is a parameter critical to blockchain operation and therefore engages the applicable SPO voting requirement under PARAM-03a. The governance action does not seek to bypass or diminish either voting body's constitutional role.

Bundling of changes

Cardano Curia acknowledges that the minPoolCost adjustment and Plutus memory-limit increases address different policy objectives. Bundling can reduce voter granularity because voters must evaluate the package as one governance action. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not prohibit such bundling where each parameter change independently complies with the applicable guardrails and the combined action preserves all required voting thresholds.

The two Plutus memory parameters are directly correlated and are appropriately considered together. The minPoolCost change independently satisfies its economic and governance-system guardrails. Cardano Curia therefore identifies no constitutional violation arising solely from their inclusion in the same Parameter Update action.

Constitutional determination

Each effective parameter change remains inside the applicable mandatory constitutional limits. The proposal provides adequate economic and technical justification, preserves the roles of DReps and SPOs, follows a measured staged approach for the Plutus memory increase, and provides supporting evidence addressing network performance and sustainability.

Cardano Curia therefore finds no constitutional basis to reject this governance action.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the precedent that a Parameter Update governance action may contain multiple parameter changes when each proposed value independently complies with its applicable constitutional guardrails, the relevant technical or economic justification is provided, and the combination does not circumvent the voting requirements applicable to any included parameter.

It also supports the use of staged parameter adjustments where the complete target has undergone technical evaluation and each individual step remains within the applicable per-epoch guidance. A staged approach can provide a prudent mechanism for increasing network capacity while retaining opportunities for monitoring and review between changes.

For economic parameters such as minPoolCost, the Constitution establishes boundaries and governance requirements rather than prescribing one permanently fixed economic value. Adjustment within those boundaries is therefore constitutionally permissible when supported by a credible rationale addressing changing network and economic conditions.

Counterargument Discussion: Cardano Curia considered two principal counterarguments.

First, bundling the minPoolCost reduction with the Plutus memory-limit increases prevents voters from expressing separate preferences on the economic and technical changes. This is a legitimate governance-quality concern. However, the Constitution does not prohibit the inclusion of multiple compliant parameter changes in one Parameter Update action. Each change has an identifiable rationale, independently satisfies its applicable guardrails, and the bundled action remains subject to all voting requirements triggered by its constituent parameters. Cardano Curia therefore does not find the bundling constitutionally disqualifying.

Second, reducing minPoolCost may alter stake pool economic incentives, while increasing Plutus memory limits could potentially affect network resource usage and performance. These considerations warrant continued monitoring, but they do not establish a constitutional violation. The proposed minPoolCost value remains within the mandatory MPC guardrails and is supported by an economic rationale. The proposed memory values remain comfortably below their mandatory ceilings, respect the applicable incremental-change guidance, and are supported by technical testing and performance analysis.

Accordingly, these concerns are matters for prudent governance and post-enactment monitoring rather than grounds for a finding of unconstitutionality.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the governance action "Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada and increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2)" constitutional. The proposed minPoolCost, maxTxExecutionUnits[memory], and maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] values remain within the applicable Cardano Constitution guardrails. The action provides sufficient economic and technical justification, preserves the required DRep and SPO governance roles, and follows a measured approach to protocol parameter management. Cardano Curia therefore votes YES on constitutionality.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the “Scalus 2026: Maintenance, Dijkstra Readiness, Interoperability & Application Runtime” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional by a unanimous internal vote of five to zero.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal requests 2,464,844 ADA for a nine-month Scalus work programme running from July 2026 through March 2027. The proposal funds maintenance and Dijkstra hard-fork readiness, JVM and JavaScript/TypeScript interoperability, and a scoped first application-runtime release. Lantr Engineering is the delivery vendor.

Constitutional determination

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional.

The proposal is submitted in a legible and sufficiently detailed form. It states the purpose of the withdrawal, the delivery period, the costs, the milestone structure, the acceptance evidence, the reporting duties, and the circumstances in which unused funds are returned. Its scope is bounded across three quarterly milestones, and the proposal expressly excludes the larger standalone L1-node, full L2-integration, and broad formal-verification work contained in an earlier version.

The costs are tied to identified engineering, product, documentation, developer-enablement, audit, and assurance activities. The proposal discloses Lantr Engineering’s prior Cardano Treasury withdrawal and provides references to the earlier funding and delivery record.

Periodic independent technical assurance is assigned to No.Witness Labs, with funds expressly allocated for that work. The proposal also provides for an external financial audit of treasury management and fund use, quarterly technical and delivery reporting, and a public transaction journal linking disbursements and other escrow actions to on-chain evidence.

Treasury administration is performed through audited SundaeSwap escrow contracts with an independent oversight board. Milestone disbursement requires vendor and board approval; board members can pause milestones; unused funds can be swept early; and funds remaining after expiration return automatically to the Cardano Treasury. The escrow enforces auto-abstain DRep delegation and prohibits SPO delegation while funds remain under administration.

The majority therefore finds that the proposal meets the applicable governance-action and Treasury Withdrawal standards concerning purpose, delivery period, costs, prior-funding disclosure, independent assurance, administration, auditability, oversight, delegation controls, and refund mechanisms. Its open-source developer-infrastructure purpose is also consistent with the constitutional tenets supporting application development, safe preservation of ecosystem infrastructure, and proportionate use of Cardano resources.

Precedent Discussion: This determination supports the precedent that continued Treasury funding for established open-source infrastructure can be constitutional where the new request is materially bounded, responds to prior governance concerns, defines dated milestones and measurable evidence, discloses prior funding, and places funds behind independent oversight, audit and automatic refund controls.

Counterargument Discussion: The principal concerns are delivery rather than constitutional defects. The application runtime is described as a foundational first release rather than a complete production runtime, and final Dijkstra readiness depends partly on the protocol schedule. Continued maintenance also creates some vendor-continuity risk. These limitations are expressly disclosed, the scope is bounded, and milestone review permits funds to be paused or withheld. Cardano Curia therefore does not find that these risks establish a conflict with the Constitution. This determination is not a guarantee of delivery, adoption, or future technical performance.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the Scalus 2026 Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional. The decision is based on its defined nine-month scope, detailed costs and milestones, prior-funding disclosure, independent technical and financial assurance, public reporting, audited escrow, oversight-board controls, required delegation policy, and enforceable return of unused funds.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the “Dano Finance: DeFi Kernel” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional by a majority vote of four to one.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal governance action requests 3,333,000 ADA: 3,300,000 ADA for delivery and 33,000 ADA for budget administration. The funded work comprises a public DeFi Kernel registry and submission process, a Spot Leverage Order Book, an American Options protocol, and a Composable DeFi Transaction Builder SDK. Minswap Labs is identified as budget administrator.

Majority determination

By a four-member majority, Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional.

The majority considers the proposal sufficiently specific and auditable for a Treasury Withdrawal. It identifies the purpose of the withdrawal, the total amount, the delivery budget and administration fee, four defined work packages, milestone deliverables, measurable KPIs, reporting obligations, security-review gates, and circumstances in which funds will not be disbursed or will be returned.

The work packages are tied to concrete outputs. These include a public registry, compatibility documentation, testnet and mainnet deployments, published script hashes and schemas, security-review or audit reports, an SDK release, integration examples, usage reporting, and final work-package reports. The proposal also provides public on-chain KPIs for trading volume, option notional volume, registry publication, and external integration activity.

The majority further notes that Minswap Labs is designated to support fund administration, milestone review, and accountability. Critical unresolved security issues block affected mainnet milestones, and funds that are unearned, unnecessary, cancelled, blocked, or associated with undeliverable milestones are to remain unspent or be returned under the administrator’s process. Dano Finance also commits to return five percent of specified protocol fees for twelve months after mainnet launch.

On a holistic reading, the majority finds these provisions sufficient to meet the Constitution’s requirements concerning purpose, costs, delivery structure, administration, oversight, audit or security assurance, public reporting, and refund circumstances. The majority finds no demonstrated conflict with the Cardano Blockchain tenets or applicable Treasury Withdrawal guardrails.

Precedent Discussion: This determination supports the precedent that a Treasury Withdrawal for open ecosystem infrastructure and production protocols may be constitutional when the proposal defines the funded outputs, milestones, administrator, security gates, public KPIs, reporting obligations, and non-disbursement or refund conditions. Constitutionality does not constitute a guarantee of commercial success or technical performance; it reflects the majority’s conclusion that the governance action is sufficiently specified and controlled for constitutional purposes.

Counterargument Discussion: One Cardano Curia member voted unconstitutional. The dissent applies a stricter textual reading of the Treasury Withdrawal standards and identifies four concerns: (1) the proposal does not expressly disclose whether the recipient received Treasury ada during the preceding 24 months; (2) the proposal describes smart-contract security reviews or audits but does not separately identify a funded program of periodic independent use-of-funds audits; (3) the proposal does not expressly state the separate-account, no-SPO-delegation, and predefined-abstain controls that apply if the administrator holds ada before disbursement; and (4) milestone timing is linked to delivery events and post-launch KPI windows rather than fixed calendar dates.

The majority does not dismiss these concerns. It concludes, however, that the action contains sufficient substantive controls to be constitutional and that the custody-specific account requirements apply according to the actual administration arrangement. The majority treats the identified omissions as implementation and documentation matters that do not, on the record reviewed, establish that the governance action itself would operate contrary to the Constitution. The dissent would treat the absence of each express statement as a failure of a mandatory submission requirement.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the “Dano Finance: DeFi Kernel” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional by an internal vote of four constitutional and one unconstitutional. The majority relies on the proposal’s defined purpose and budget, work packages, milestone deliverables, administrator, security-review gates, public reporting and KPIs, and non-disbursement and refund conditions. The minority dissent is recorded in full because it raises material questions about express disclosure, independent financial auditing, administrator custody controls, and fixed delivery dates.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the “Bifrost: Unlocking Bitcoin DeFi on Cardano — Road to Mainnet (Phase 1 of 2)” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional by a unanimous internal vote of five to zero.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal requests 12,332,031 ADA for Bifrost Phase 1, delivered by FluidTokens and Lantr Engineering from July 2026 through March 2027. The proposal funds bridge hardening, external security audits, formal verification, penetration testing, ecosystem and SPO readiness, legal and stewardship work, and a controlled private-mainnet deployment in federated and SPO-threshold custody modes. Public launch and ongoing operations are expressly excluded and reserved for a later Phase 2 proposal.

Constitutional determination

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional.

The proposal identifies a clear purpose, a nine-month delivery period, three dated milestones, detailed workstreams, acceptance evidence, an itemised budget, reporting obligations, and refund circumstances. The requested amount includes a separately identified ten-percent refundable contingency, and any unused contingency is committed for return to the Cardano Treasury.

The security work is extensive and directly connected to milestone acceptance. It includes smart-contract and cryptographic review, formal verification of critical paths, watchtower and off-chain audits, penetration testing, a bug-bounty programme, remediation requirements, and publication of audit and verification evidence. No.Witness Labs is assigned periodic third-party assurance, and an external financial auditor is funded to review Phase 1 treasury management and use of funds.

The proposal discloses relevant prior support, including Lantr Engineering’s prior Cardano Treasury withdrawal and Catalyst funding for the Bifrost testnet programme. It distinguishes the previously funded testnet work from the present mainnet-hardening and assurance scope.

Grant administration is separated from the bridge’s future stewardship. FluidTokens, Lantr Engineering and an independent oversight board control milestone-based disbursement through audited SundaeSwap escrow contracts. Board members can pause milestones; disbursements require multiple independent approvals; unused funds may be swept early; and funds remaining after expiration return automatically to the Cardano Treasury. The escrow enforces auto-abstain DRep delegation and no SPO delegation for Treasury funds while they remain under administration.

The proposal therefore satisfies the applicable governance-action and Treasury Withdrawal standards concerning specificity, delivery period, costs, prior-funding disclosure, independent audits, oversight metrics, administration, auditability, delegation controls and refunds. Its cross-chain infrastructure purpose is consistent with the constitutional tenets supporting application development, interoperability, safe preservation of value and information, and responsible use of resources. The phased approach also avoids presenting the private-mainnet deployment as a completed public service before the required security evidence exists.

Precedent Discussion: This determination supports the precedent that high-risk cross-chain infrastructure can be constitutionally funded when the proposal clearly separates development phases, defines the limits of the funded outcome, uses independent technical and financial assurance, gates disbursement against public evidence, and prevents unspent Treasury funds from being used for staking or governance influence.

Counterargument Discussion: Bifrost carries substantial technical and operational risk because it coordinates Bitcoin custody, threshold signing, watchtowers and cross-chain asset issuance. Phase 1 also ends with controlled private-mainnet access rather than a public launch, and the permanent stewardship entity and economic model are themselves Phase 1 deliverables. These facts may affect a voter’s assessment of value, feasibility or delivery risk, but they are clearly disclosed and are paired with audits, formal verification, controlled exposure, milestone gates, public evidence and independent oversight. Cardano Curia therefore finds no constitutional conflict. This determination does not certify the bridge as technically secure, guarantee a Phase 2 approval, or endorse any unfinalised economic parameter.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the Bifrost Phase 1 Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional. The decision is based on its defined phased scope, dated milestones, detailed budget, refundable contingency, prior-funding disclosures, extensive independent assurance, financial audit, public evidence requirements, multi-party escrow administration, delegation controls, and enforceable return of unused funds.

Summary: Cardano Curia records a majority finding that the Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment Treasury Withdrawal is constitutional, with four constitutional votes and one unconstitutional vote.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This governance action requests a Treasury Withdrawal of 9,000,000 ada for a twelve-month liquidity deployment associated with Strike Finance V2. The proposal contemplates conversion of ada into USDM, deployment into perpetual-futures liquidity, periodic reporting, and return of realized yield and remaining assets according to the published schedule.

Majority constitutional view

Four Cardano Curia members found the action constitutional. The majority considered that the proposal identifies a defined purpose, delivery period, administrators, segregated custody arrangements, reporting commitments, return mechanics, and independent assurance arrangements. The majority also credited Tingvard-related audit and assurance work as a meaningful safeguard supporting auditability and public oversight.

The majority determined that the action is capable of operating consistently with the Constitution's Treasury Withdrawal standards, provided the published administration, audit, reporting, custody, abstain-delegation, and return-to-treasury commitments remain binding and verifiable throughout execution.

Minority unconstitutional view

One Cardano Curia member found the action unconstitutional. The minority view was that the proposal does not state with sufficient clarity an explicit ada allocation within the withdrawal for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics, as required by the Treasury Withdrawal standards. The minority also considered the capital-preservation, conversion, custody, and mandatory wind-down controls insufficiently precise for a risk-bearing treasury deployment.

Determination

By a vote of four to one, Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. This determination addresses constitutional compliance and does not guarantee delivery performance, asset preservation, stablecoin solvency, protocol security, or financial return.

Precedent Discussion: The majority decision supports the precedent that a Treasury Withdrawal used for a temporary, risk-bearing liquidity deployment may be constitutional where its purpose, duration, custody, administration, assurance, reporting, and return mechanisms are sufficiently documented. The minority cautions that voluntary or externally funded assurance should not be treated as a substitute for an explicit audit allocation where the Constitution requires such an allocation.

Counterargument Discussion: The principal counterarguments are that Treasury ada is exposed to conversion risk, USDM risk, smart-contract risk, market-making losses, administrator discretion, and uncertain enforcement of return obligations. A further constitutional objection concerns whether Tingvard's audit work constitutes the required allocation of ada for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics. The majority considered the assurance framework sufficient when read together with the proposal's other safeguards; the minority did not.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds governance action 8721696358acdd43e34e5ed9ef1b3e2a1d2af9c1aa1972e017b9b9271b7ddc70#0 constitutional by an internal vote of four constitutional and one unconstitutional, with no abstentions and no members recorded as not voting.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Treasury Withdrawal for UTxO RPC by TxPipe: Maintaining Cardano's Integration Standard constitutional.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal funds continued maintenance of UTxO RPC and its multi-language integration tooling. The requested amount is 540,750 ada.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia reviewed this action as a Treasury Withdrawal under the Constitution's governance-action standards and treasury-withdrawal requirements. The relevant requirements include a clear purpose and delivery period, disclosure of costs and refund circumstances, prior-funding disclosure, compliance with the applicable Net Change Limit, funded independent audit and oversight, designated administrators, and segregated auditable accounts delegated to the predefined abstain option while held before disbursement.

The standard is used across several Cardano node and integration workstreams. Continued maintenance supports interoperability and reduces duplicated integration effort.

The action is also consistent with the constitutional tenets concerning fair treatment, reasonable use of blockchain resources, recognition of ecosystem contributions, preservation of value, and long-term sustainability, provided that the published administration, reporting, audit, milestone, and return-to-treasury commitments remain binding throughout execution.

Determination

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. This is a determination of constitutional compliance, not a guarantee of delivery performance or financial return.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawals for ecosystem infrastructure, governance operations, adoption, or market development may be constitutional where their purpose, administration, auditability, oversight, delivery controls, and return mechanisms are sufficiently specified.

Counterargument Discussion: Material counterarguments concern delivery risk, concentration of administrative authority, cost control, conflicts of interest, and whether oversight commitments will be implemented exactly as published. These concerns do not establish a constitutional conflict where segregated custody, milestone controls, public reporting, independent assurance, and return-to-treasury mechanisms are binding and auditable.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds governance action b3d452bff7769d7f557ec6b8974760ee6c5e496c276652b654032966621e0ccf#10 constitutional and records five internal votes for constitutional, with no votes for unconstitutional or abstain.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Treasury Withdrawal for Bringing Real-World Payments to Cardano with Wirex constitutional.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal funds work intended to expand real-world Cardano payment access through Wirex. The requested amount is 3,961,538 ada.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia reviewed this action as a Treasury Withdrawal under the Constitution's governance-action standards and treasury-withdrawal requirements. The relevant requirements include a clear purpose and delivery period, disclosure of costs and refund circumstances, prior-funding disclosure, compliance with the applicable Net Change Limit, funded independent audit and oversight, designated administrators, and segregated auditable accounts delegated to the predefined abstain option while held before disbursement.

The proposal has a defined payments-adoption purpose and is administered through the Intersect treasury-management framework, which separates reserve custody from project disbursement and provides community-verifiable controls.

The action is also consistent with the constitutional tenets concerning fair treatment, reasonable use of blockchain resources, recognition of ecosystem contributions, preservation of value, and long-term sustainability, provided that the published administration, reporting, audit, milestone, and return-to-treasury commitments remain binding throughout execution.

Determination

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. This is a determination of constitutional compliance, not a guarantee of delivery performance or financial return.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawals for ecosystem infrastructure, governance operations, adoption, or market development may be constitutional where their purpose, administration, auditability, oversight, delivery controls, and return mechanisms are sufficiently specified.

Counterargument Discussion: Material counterarguments concern delivery risk, concentration of administrative authority, cost control, conflicts of interest, and whether oversight commitments will be implemented exactly as published. These concerns do not establish a constitutional conflict where segregated custody, milestone controls, public reporting, independent assurance, and return-to-treasury mechanisms are binding and auditable.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds governance action b3d452bff7769d7f557ec6b8974760ee6c5e496c276652b654032966621e0ccf#0 constitutional and records five internal votes for constitutional, with no votes for unconstitutional or abstain.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Treasury Withdrawal for Dolos by TxPipe: Maintaining Cardano's Lightweight Data Node constitutional.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal funds a further year of maintenance for Dolos, TxPipe's lightweight Cardano data node. The requested amount is 540,750 ada.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia reviewed this action as a Treasury Withdrawal under the Constitution's governance-action standards and treasury-withdrawal requirements. The relevant requirements include a clear purpose and delivery period, disclosure of costs and refund circumstances, prior-funding disclosure, compliance with the applicable Net Change Limit, funded independent audit and oversight, designated administrators, and segregated auditable accounts delegated to the predefined abstain option while held before disbursement.

Maintaining an open-source data-node implementation supports resilient infrastructure and developer access. The proposal identifies a bounded maintenance period and uses milestone-controlled Intersect administration.

The action is also consistent with the constitutional tenets concerning fair treatment, reasonable use of blockchain resources, recognition of ecosystem contributions, preservation of value, and long-term sustainability, provided that the published administration, reporting, audit, milestone, and return-to-treasury commitments remain binding throughout execution.

Determination

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. This is a determination of constitutional compliance, not a guarantee of delivery performance or financial return.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawals for ecosystem infrastructure, governance operations, adoption, or market development may be constitutional where their purpose, administration, auditability, oversight, delivery controls, and return mechanisms are sufficiently specified.

Counterargument Discussion: Material counterarguments concern delivery risk, concentration of administrative authority, cost control, conflicts of interest, and whether oversight commitments will be implemented exactly as published. These concerns do not establish a constitutional conflict where segregated custody, milestone controls, public reporting, independent assurance, and return-to-treasury mechanisms are binding and auditable.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds governance action b3d452bff7769d7f557ec6b8974760ee6c5e496c276652b654032966621e0ccf#1 constitutional and records five internal votes for constitutional, with no votes for unconstitutional or abstain.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Treasury Withdrawal for Hardware Wallet Maintenance 2026 constitutional.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed
This Treasury Withdrawal funds twelve months of Cardano hardware-wallet compatibility, interoperability, support, and security-related maintenance. The requested amount is 1,310,960 ada.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia reviewed this action as a Treasury Withdrawal under the Constitution's governance-action standards and treasury-withdrawal requirements. The relevant requirements include a clear purpose and delivery period, disclosure of costs and refund circumstances, prior-funding disclosure, compliance with the applicable Net Change Limit, funded independent audit and oversight, designated administrators, and segregated auditable accounts delegated to the predefined abstain option while held before disbursement.

Continuous Ledger and Trezor support protects secure user access as Cardano and vendor software evolve. The stated scope includes compatibility work, integration support, and vendor-required security or product audits.

The action is also consistent with the constitutional tenets concerning fair treatment, reasonable use of blockchain resources, recognition of ecosystem contributions, preservation of value, and long-term sustainability, provided that the published administration, reporting, audit, milestone, and return-to-treasury commitments remain binding throughout execution.

Determination

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. This is a determination of constitutional compliance, not a guarantee of delivery performance or financial return.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawals for ecosystem infrastructure, governance operations, adoption, or market development may be constitutional where their purpose, administration, auditability, oversight, delivery controls, and return mechanisms are sufficiently specified.

Counterargument Discussion: Material counterarguments concern delivery risk, concentration of administrative authority, cost control, conflicts of interest, and whether oversight commitments will be implemented exactly as published. These concerns do not establish a constitutional conflict where segregated custody, milestone controls, public reporting, independent assurance, and return-to-treasury mechanisms are binding and auditable.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds governance action b3d452bff7769d7f557ec6b8974760ee6c5e496c276652b654032966621e0ccf#2 constitutional and records five internal votes for constitutional, with no votes for unconstitutional or abstain.